Weapons failed US troops during Afghan firefight
http://apnews.mywa...011/D9B8SUPO0.html

Oct 11, 8:28 AM (ET) | By RICHARD LARDNER

WASHINGTON (AP) - In the chaos of an early morning assault on a remote U.S. outpost in eastern Afghanistan, Staff Sgt. Erich Phillips' M4 carbine quit firing as militant forces surrounded the base. The machine gun he grabbed after tossing the rifle aside didn't work either.

When the battle in the small village of Wanat ended, nine U.S. soldiers lay dead and 27 more were wounded. A detailed study of the attack by a military historian found that weapons failed repeatedly at a "critical moment" during the firefight on July 13, 2008, putting the outnumbered American troops at risk of being overrun by nearly 200 insurgents.

Which raises the question: Eight years into the war against the Taliban in Afghanistan, do U.S. armed forces have the best guns money can buy?

Despite the military's insistence that they do, a small but vocal number of troops in Afghanistan and Iraq has complained that the standard-issue M4 rifles need too much maintenance and jam at the worst possible times.

A week ago, eight U.S. troops were killed at a base near Kamdesh, a town near Wanat. There's no immediate evidence of weapons failures at Kamdesh, but the circumstances were eerily similar to the Wanat battle: insurgents stormed an isolated stronghold manned by American forces stretched thin by the demands of war.

Army Col. Wayne Shanks, a military spokesman in Afghanistan, said a review of the battle at Kamdesh is under way. "It is too early to make any assumptions regarding what did or didn't work correctly," he said.

Complaints about the weapons the troops carry, especially the M4, aren't new. Army officials say that when properly cleaned and maintained, the M4 is a quality weapon that can pump out more than 3,000 rounds before any failures occur.

The M4 is a shorter, lighter version of the M16, which made its debut during the Vietnam war. Roughly 500,000 M4s are in service, making it the rifle troops on the front lines trust with their lives.

Sen. Tom Coburn, R-Okla., a leading critic of the M4, said Thursday the Army needs to move quickly to acquire a combat rifle suited for the extreme conditions U.S. troops are fighting in.

U.S. special operations forces, with their own acquisition budget and the latitude to buy gear the other military branches can't, already are replacing their M4s with a new rifle.

"The M4 has served us well but it's not as good as it needs to be," Coburn said.

Battlefield surveys show that nearly 90 percent of soldiers are satisfied with their M4s, according to Brig. Gen. Peter Fuller, head of the Army office that buys soldier gear. Still, the rifle is continually being improved to make it even more reliable and lethal.

Fuller said he's received no official reports of flawed weapons performance at Wanat. "Until it showed up in the news, I was surprised to hear about all this," he said.

The study by Douglas Cubbison of the Army Combat Studies Institute at Fort Leavenworth, Kan., hasn't been publicly released. Copies of the study have been leaked to news organizations and are circulating on the Internet.

Cubbison's study is based on an earlier Army investigation and interviews with soldiers who survived the attack at Wanat. He describes a well-coordinated attack by a highly skilled enemy that unleashed a withering barrage with AK-47 automatic rifles and rocket-propelled grenades.

The soldiers said their weapons were meticulously cared for and routinely inspected by commanders. But still the weapons had breakdowns, especially when the rifles were on full automatic, which allows hundreds of bullets to be fired a minute.

The platoon-sized unit of U.S. soldiers and about two dozen Afghan troops was shooting back with such intensity the barrels on their weapons turned white hot. The high rate of fire appears to have put a number of weapons out of commission, even though the guns are tested and built to operate in extreme conditions.

Cpl. Jonathan Ayers and Spc. Chris McKaig were firing their M4s from a position the soldiers called the "Crow's Nest." The pair would pop up together from cover, fire half a dozen rounds and then drop back down.

On one of these trips up, Ayers was killed instantly by an enemy round. McKaig soon had problems with his M4, which carries a 30-round magazine.

"My weapon was overheating," McKaig said, according to Cubbison's report. "I had shot about 12 magazines by this point already and it had only been about a half hour or so into the fight. I couldn't charge my weapon and put another round in because it was too hot, so I got mad and threw my weapon down."

The soldiers also had trouble with their M249 machine guns, a larger weapon than the M4 that can shoot up to 750 rounds per minute.

Cpl. Jason Bogar fired approximately 600 rounds from his M-249 before the weapon overheated and jammed the weapon.

Bogar was killed during the firefight, but no one saw how he died, according to the report.

Look, the M-4 is just an updated M-16. The 16 did one thing with great regularity during its career - jammed. David Hackworth hated the damn thing, and I hate it too. Weapons made by the lowest bidder should be in the hands of the poorest armies in the world, not in the hands of our troops.

How would you guys feel if the US switched over to AK47's or FAL's? I know its not going to happen.

We have a few good options - one of which is a piston-driven M4, ala the HK-416.
The other problem is that 5.56mm is too small.
USSOCOM selectively uses a 6.8mm round and some units carry some S/S M-1A rifles in 7.62mm.
In the end, budget concerns will drive this matter.
Companies want to sell us more shit.
Hell - they're looking at replacing the .50 with a newfangled polymer weapon.
Scary.

Posted by big dave How would you guys feel if the US switched over to AK47's or FAL's? I know its not going to happen.

FAL was a fine weapon. VERY heavy, and the weight of the cartridge limits how much ammo you can carry.

Teh AK doesn't blow my skirt up. Good milled version, with a quality barrel and good ammo are fine. The stamped and welded versions range in accuracy from semi OK to abysmal. I do like the 7.62x39 round.

As for the 5.56x45, the original bullet worked much better. It tumbled upon impact and did more damage. Modern versions are very stable, and the green tipped penetrator version works more like an icepick: .22 hole in and .22 hole out.

You may all think I'm crazy, but a scaled down FAL or G3 in .243 would suit me just fine. Still a fairly heavy round, but you can't have everything in one gun.

This is from downrange.
WOW.

Here are the facts, without revealing sensitive information.
I feel compelled to write this because I heard some very fine, brave Americans fought for their very lives Saturday, 03 OCT 09.
They fought magnificently.
Eight of them made the Ultimate Sacrifice. I don't know their names, only their call signs.
Though it may have been smaller in scale, and shorter in duration, their battle was no less heroic than the exploits of their ancestors, in places like LZ Xray or Fire Base Ripcord in Vietnam.
I want people to know that there are still some GREAT Americans who serve in the US Army, fighting for Freedom, who will probably never be given the due they deserve.
I don't know ALL the facts, only what I overheard on the satellite radio.

COP [Combat Outpost] Keating was (past tense) located on low ground, near a river, surrounded by mountains - a poor place to have to defend to begin with. The village of Kamdesh was nearby, as was a mosque. About two platoons and a cavalry troop headquarters occupied the COP - Combat Outpost. If you Google COP Keating, you will find a Washington Times article describing the austere conditions there, written earlier this year. I was on duty from 0600-1800 (6 a.m. until 6 p.m.) on Saturday, 03 OCT 09, and heard, first-hand, the events I am about to recount transpire. I took notes as the battle unfolded.

Things were relatively quiet when I came on shift at 0600. Not too long afterward, I heard a call sign describing taking small arms fire at his position. (That in itself is not alarming - I hear that frequently because I hear satellite radio transmissions from all sorts of units who operate in Nangahar, Kunar, Laghman (where I am) and in Nuristan Provinces, where this happened.) The situation, then began to deteriorate. The Troop Commander - urgently - requested rotary wing gunships to support him. He was told they were 45 minutes away, and that he should use his 120 mm mortars. He replied that the mortar pit was pinned down, and that the could not employ his 120 mm mortars. I did not know until I saw an aerial photo later that day, after I got off shift, that the COP was located in a "bowl," surrounded on nearly all sides by high ground. The insurgents were shooting down into the mortar pit from above. The 120 mm mortars from OP [Outpost] Fritshe, a few kilometers away were able to help a little, but it was not enough. Not too long after the fight started, the Troop Commander said that he had a KIA [Killed in Action], and several wounded.

Uh-Oh - now this is getting serious. Not too much longer after that, the Troop Commander, in a voice that was not panic'd, but which had a sense of urgency said, "We've got people inside our wire!!!" He said that he had lost communications with some of his elements at different places on the COP. He had had to abandon his Tactical Operations Center (TOC) and all the various means of redundant communications there (MIRC Chat, Blue Force Tracker, tactical FM radios, etc.) His only means of communication was the satellite radio he was using. He said he urgently needed air support. The number of KIA began to climb.

He kept asking about the helicopters - his higher headquarters said they were "30 minutes out..." He said that if he did not get help soon, they were going to be overrun. He had consolidated the Soldiers he had, to include dead and wounded, in a tight perimeter on part of his COP. He advised that the Afghan National Army (ANA) side of the COP was completely overrun and was on fire. The insurgents had gotten into his perimeter where the ANA latrine bordered his perimeter, after they had overrun the ANA camp. His Entry Control Point (ECP) where some Afghan Security Guards (ASG) had been had been overrun.

The ANP Police Checkpoint had been overrun and he was taking a heavy volume of fire from that. He was taking a lot of RPG [Rocket Propelled Grenade] fire from the mosque. His Ammunition Supply Point (ASP) was under insurgent control. He kept asking about the helicopters.He was told, "Passing Checkpoint 12..." He said, "I'm telling you that if they don't get here f***in' soon, we're all going to f***in' die!!!" Shortly after that, his Squadron Commander came up on the radio and told him that he was going to be OK, that help was on the way. The SCO [Squadron Commander] said that he needed to come up on FM and talk to the helicopters, who should be arriving very soon. The Troop Commander said that the Harris was all he had at the moment, and asked that the Squadron relay. It was, obviously, a very anxious time. I was afraid that at any moment, the Troop commander would just stop transmitting, and that would mean that they were likely all dead and dying. Someone asked the Troop commander what his target priorities were, and he said that "anything outside the wire" was controlled by bad guys. He mentioned that he needed gun runs at a particular wall, and mentioned certain Target Reference Points (TRP's) such as "the putting green" and "the diving board." Finally, the helicopters arrived and began killing insurgents. It became clear, however, that it was such a target-rich environment that much more air support was needed. The helicopters gave the defenders enough breathing room to better position themselves, reload, etc. Under the umbrella of the gunships, the Troop Commander said that he was going to try to re-take some of his camp. The SCO calmly encouraged him to "fire and maneuver." As they regained some lost ground, the Troop Commander said that he was finding some of his unaccounted for Soldiers, and that they were KIA. He gave their battle roster numbers. Things were looking better, but it was still a fierce fight. I could hear a cacophony of machine gun fire when the Troop Commander keyed that microphone to talk. The mortars were still pinned won, with one KIA and wounded in the mortar pit. After only a short time, gunships had to leave to rearm and refuel, heading to FOB Bostic. (FOB Bostic was hit with indirect fire, also, throughout the day.) The weather in the high passes interfered with the helicopters. Close Air Support in the form of jets were on the way, and the Troop Commander was asked to provide Target Numbers, which he did. He was still being pressed on all sides, still taking a heavy volume of small arms fire and RPG's. He had regained some buildings, but had not been able to re-capture all his perimeter. He found at least one MBITR and was able to communicate with aircraft a little better.

Once the jets arrived overhead, they began to drop bombs on the masses, the swarms of insurgents. Usually, the insurgents conduct a raid at dawn, do their damage, and flee. Not this day. I looked at my watch, and it was after 1000 and the insurgents were still attacking, even though it should have become clear to them after the close air arrived that they could no longer hope to completely overrun the camp. The Close Air was on station continuously after that, and as soon as one plane dropped its bombs and strafed, another came down to hit targets - some very close to camp. The mosque was hit by a Hellfire, and open source now reports that a high profile insurgent named Dost Mohammad was killed there. A target described as a "switchback" was bombed repeatedly and the insurgents seemed to simply re-occupy it only to be bombed out of it again. (Several pieces of weapons and equipment has since been found there.) The "North Face" was also repeatedly bombed and strafed.

A plan was developed to get reinforcements to COP Keating. Because it was still "too hot" to land helicopters, they were flown to OP Fritshe and had to walk to COP Keating. Asked about his ammunition (Class 5) at about 1300, the Troop commander said that he was "red" on 7.62 link and MK19 ammunition [the MK19 is a belt-fed automatic 40 mm grenade launcher, the 7.62 ammo would be used in M240 machineguns]. Not too long after that, he stated that he was "black" (supply exhausted) on 7.62, but still had a lot of .50 caliber. More KIA were found, and the Troop Commander said that they were missing their sensitive items (weapons, night vision, MBITR radios - things like that.) The KIA number rose to 5. There were constant updates on a particular wounded Soldier who had a broken leg and a crushed pelvis. They said that he had lost a lot of blood, but was on an IV, and was "hanging in there." The Troop Commander said that he had two ANA KIA, and several wounded, still with him. He said that a lot of the ANA - about 12 - had broken and run when the COP began to be overrun. (Some of their bodies were found nearby the next day, along with some ASG who were wounded.) The Troop Commander said that the insurgents had made off with the ANA's B-10 Rocket Launcher. Throughout the day, the air support targeted a B-10 launch site, but it was unclear if it was the same system that the ANA had lost of not.

The SCO got on the net and said that there was a plan to bring in a CH-47 Chinook as soon as it got dark, with attack helicopters overhead, and that they would bring in ammo and Soldiers and evacuate the wounded and dead. The SCO said that he would fly in, also. During the battle, the SCO always seemed calm and gave a lot of encouragement to the Troop Commander on the ground. He asked for updates (Situation Reports - "SITREPS") but he did not nag the Troop Commander for it every 5 minutes. He let the Troop Commander fight the fight, frequently asking him what he needed and asking him how he and his Soldiers were doing, offering encouragement, but not micromanaging.

The fighting continued all day, even though it was not as intense as it had been in the early morning. As the relief column approached from OP Fritshe, it got into a brief fight, quickly killing two insurgents and capturing their ICOM radios and RPG's. Then, they continued on toward COP Keating. The fire that had completely leveled the ANA side of the COP was spreading from building to building, and was setting the COP on fire. The Troop Commander and his Soldiers had to evacuate their TOC again, because it caught on fire.

Many of the barracks buildings caught on fire and burned, taking the Soldiers' possessions with them. Only one or two buildings were left by the time it was over. As night approached, the Troop Commander told someone (S-3? FSO?) [the S-3 is the supply officer, the FSO is the Fire Support Officer, who would coordinate with the attack helos] that if the air cover were lost, and if they were attacked again, they were "done." The Troop Commander was assured that he would have adequate air support. The CSM [Command Sergeant Major] came up on the net and asked the Troop Commander to try to expand his perimeter in order to try to get accountability of everyone. The Troop Commander said that he "just can't do it, I just don't have enough people. I have too many wounded." The CSM said that he understood, but that he was looking at a cold body on the Predator feed near the maintenance building, and thought that that might be the final missing soldier. (It was later determined that that was not him.) The Troop Commander said that there were "a lot" of dead insurgents lying dead inside his perimeter, and he could be seeing one of those.

I went off shift at 1800. At that time, there were 6 US KIA, and one missing, later found and determined to be KIA. I do not know where the 8th KIA came from: either one of the wounded died, or earlier there was a mistake in regard to accountability.

The next day (Sunday, 4 OCT) when I came to work, I learned that they had found the unaccounted-for Soldier(s) and had made it through the night. During the late morning, the SCO came up on the net and briefed someone about the situation. He said that of five (5) HMMWV's, only one was still running. They had counted eight (8) RPG impacts on one HMMWV {Humvee] alone. He said that the HMMWV's were shot all to pieces. The camp Bobcat had a window shot out, but was still running, and they were still using it to move things.

There was a lot of UXO's (unexploded ordnance) that made the area hazardous, such as unexploded US mortar rounds that had been scattered, as well as AT-4's and Javelin's [rocket launchers]. Most of the Soldiers on the COP had lost all their possessions except for what they were wearing. A plan was already being developed to get them new TA-50, uniforms, boots, toiletries, etc. once they were extracted. There were a lot of sensitive items that needed to be lifted out, because they are serial numbered items that needed to be accounted for, but most everything was ruined. They discussed whether to insert engineers with a lot of explosive to blow everything up, or whether to call in air strikes after everyone was evacuated and try to destroy what was left that way. Even at this point, they were still taking the occasional odd, angry shot or rocket fire. As I type this, I am still listening to the folks who are left at COP Keating, figuring out what to destroy, how best to destroy it (demo vs. aerial bombs or rockets) what to fly out, and making a plan on how best to get that done so they can abandon and close the COP.

Goddamn. I mean just Goddamn. Could have been us man. Sounds like they did a damn fine job just to hang on at all.

Yeah.
I have been in a desperate gunfight or 2, but I never thought I was going to be over run.
I wanna buy that troop a beer.

Posted by DevilC Yeah. I have been in a desperate gunfight or 2, but I never thought I was going to be over run. I wanna buy that troop a beer.

Damn good troops.
It could easily be a description of a firefight in Nam. Support took too long.

Yeah - textbook! From this account the Taliban knocked out the main support weapons first, drove the command team from the TOC - all but crippling comms, destroyed the vehicles that provided a means of protected tactical manoeuvre, launched indirect attacks on a nearby FOB that also serves to rearm tactical aviation, and ambushed the relief column. Sounds like a textbook raid that netted captured American gear, ANSF hostages, and a localized propaganda coup.

Taking a step back, this points out the very great danger of raising and training proxy forces to fight your wars on the sly: you can't control them forever. It's irrelevant who provided the actual training for this particular group - those skills were imparted to radicals in the region by American and Pakistani intelligence and special forces a couple of decades ago. Who'd have thought those fighters would eventually come to have their own interests, the will to fight for those interests, and the capability to pass on their own training to the next generation?!

It also reveals a weakness of the proposed strategy of targeting leaders. To mix metaphors, it's not enough to cut the heads off the snakes - you have to drain the swamp, thus eliminating the breeding grounds, else the fight will carry on indefinitely.

Maybe a bit much to extrapolate from a single event, but there's more here than just a reminder that growing up poor and illiterate (but multilingual!) doesn't make the Taliban stupid.

The morale of the Taliban insurgents must be high in order to carry out this kind of attack, knowing they would be hit hard by air power. Their morale was probably lifted at seeing the COP abandoned.
We can not win this war.

Posted by DevilC The morale of the Taliban insurgents must be high in order to carry out this kind of attack, knowing they would be hit hard by air power. Their morale was probably lifted at seeing the COP abandoned. We can not win this war.

I would generally agree with that. To me, the only other possibility is that they are stretched damned thin, and wanted to make a statement at any cost. We now know that North Viet Nam wanted Tet to kill off a bunch of the Viet Cong, to make them less of a force when the eventual takeover of the South came later. Perhaps higher ups were willing to take heavy losses for reasons we don't understand yet. A stretch I know, but I suppose a possibility.

As for winning the war, got to define winning hombre. If our "victory" is to stay there for 35 years and fight a terrible war of attrition, hey man, we can do that.

And on topic, I still say the M-16 / M-4 sucks balls. Need a .223 that works in the desert? We could always buy Galils.

wow I didnt read all that but wow


last time I had anything to do with an HK (91) it wasnt gas op it was delayed roller blowback which while heavier I think is more reliable after 1000s of dirty condition rounds

never understood our love affair with the pop gun I'll just keep my old M14 SA thank you very much

thank you to the guys and gals over there.

imho the m16 and its versions are fine rifles, for the range. i do not own one... yet... i do agree that the .223 is to small but it dose what it was developed to do. i have a ruger mini 14 in .223 and it runs all the time. never had a jam/ftf/fte/ or any other failure of the action. loading the mag is its only tricky part to me. as far as accuracy, forget it right out of the box. hot/cold way different poi's. but it runs good all the time. i will take reliability over accuracy if my ass was on the line. i dont see the gubment going after this rifle, but given its design, (garand) it could lead to something... maybe...
cdevon1200

1)
The Mini-14 is, perhaps, less reliable than the AR platform.
In longevity tests, it generally fails before standard-issue M4s.
It's accuracy is 4/5 MOA at 100m - which to me is awful.

2)
We do have a variety of M-14 (M1A) variants.
Unfortunately, they're viewed as outmoded and "low tech."
Here's a shot of a full-size M1A in the hands of a cav scout in AFG.

click to view

Posted by cdevon1200 1 ruger mini 14 in .223 2 i dont see the gubment going after this rifle,

click to view

i agree the hitting the target is very important. the root of my post is that it runs. yes the m14 is an old tech rifle but why do we still use them? cuz they run, and the are very usefull in hitting a target and that target usually does not get back up. 7.62x 51 or .308 doing somewhere around 2800fps or better is a good thing whern the targets are 600 or more yards out AND are shooting back at you. just out of usefull reach of the .223. the mini is not that good i say, but it does run. the ar/m16 needs constant cleaning.
again this is just my opinion
cdevon1200

No - you're right.
We should be using something more like the Galil or Valmet.
The HK rebuild of the AR that SOCOM is presently using is a pretty close compromise - it's a piston-driven AR platform.

Posted by cdevon1200 the ar/m16 needs constant cleaning.

as much as I like my little Ruger its accuracy is pretty disappointing. I built some home loads with the 62gr slug that grouped quite around 2 moa

(for comparison my lend lease ie. new m1 carbine un-altered, iron sights does about 1.5 moa or better)

my M14SA on the other hand shoots tighter than I can hold without a rest, I love to shoot this rifle I put a scope mount on it dialed in at 100 with cheap white box commercial fmj and got almost moa off the bench but the mounting system (Springfield) was crap, never could get the parallax out of the damn thing tightened it down it still moves around, so Im back to squinting through a peep with my 53yr old eye

if I ever need to engage anything/anyone seriously, hopefully it'll be under 100yds anyway and past that I'll probably just run away..

the other issue with these besides weight is length getting in and out of a vehicle with one etc I think a lot of people would simply not like it

Posted by 2Xplorations (for comparison my lend lease ie. new m1 carbine un-altered, iron sights does about 1.5 moa or better)

I like you more and more 2x

...... hopefully it'll be under 100yds anyway and past that I'll probably just run away..

If its past 100m, use arty or mortars.

well unfortunately the M1 bears the stamp of the re-importer Blue Sky Ordinance right out on the end of the barrel

Posted by 2Xplorations well unfortunately the M1 bears the stamp of the re-importer Blue Sky Ordinance right out on the end of the barrel

Yea and blue sky had a tendency to stamp so deep it almost oveled the barrel.

I remember when these were going for $150.00 fully tricked out...my how times have changed.