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 Curious_George
   
Location: Cambridge
Gender: Male
Straight outta New Bedlam
 |  | Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design
< on 11/24/2005 9:23 PM >
|  | | | I thought this paper may help some people:
Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design: The "Silver Bullet" of Crime Prevention?
Table of Contents
Introduction P. 1
History of CPTED P. 2
Components P
Lighting P. 3
Target Hardening P. 4
Territoriality/Defensible Space P. 5
Real Surveillance P. 9
Landscaping
Critiques
Lighting P. 11
Real Surveillance P. 12
Crime Displacement P. 14
Territoriality/Defensible Space P. 15
Empirical Studies P. 16
Conclusion P. 17
Bibliography P. 18
Introduction
There has been an ever growing pressure on local and regional governments to reduce the level of crime in their jurisdictions. The public is growing weary of hearing and being victims of muggings, home invasions, vandalism and in the most violent cases, rape and murder. These crimes have effectively “scared” citizens off of the street and from public areas such as parks and transit stations. The traditional approach to deter crime has been to increase the agents of law enforcement to create a more visible presence. The objective of such a policy is that criminals will be discouraged from engaging in criminal activity for fear of apprehension.
Increasing police presence however draws many criticisms from the public (i.e. brutality, over use of force) and places even more stress on an already tight fiscal budget. The alternative has been to implement Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED). This technique involves “developing defensible space through the belief that the physical environment can be manipulated to influence behaviour to reduce crime.” (Colquhoun, 37) It’s most basic assumption is that environmental design can affect human behavior by giving cues of how to act and through the perception of the surrounding environment. (Schneider and Pearcey, 1996; Crowe, 2000; Colquhoun, 2004) CPTED also assumes that potential offenders have rational choice; each criminal assess each situation in terms of benefits and risks before committing a criminal act. (Colquhoun, 2004; Lab, 2004)
This paper will examine the different schools of thought that led to the theory of CPTED, explain the different facets and components of CPTED, discuss the controversy of whether or not CPTED actually works in reducing crime and try to come to a conclusion as to if it even works and if so, its proper application.
History of CPTED
The history of CPTED dates back to Jane Jacobs 1961 seminal work in “The Life and Death of Great American Cities.” Jacobs states that public space is not enforced by the police but rather by the people who use the space. According to Jacobs, safe streets possess three key characteristics;
1) Clear demarcation between public & private space
2) Eyes on the street: buildings must be orientated to the street and must not turn their back to the street
3) The sidewalk must have users on it on a continuous basis for informal surveillance to occur (Jacobs, 1961, 35)
After Jacobs came Oscar Newman in 1971 with his theory and book of the same name, “Defensible Space.” He equated that building size and type had a large influence on the behaviour of human beings and in turn, had a large influence on the level of crime. These assumptions were based on Newman’s numerous studies on public housing projects in the United States and United Kingdom. One of his more famous studies includes the Brownsville and Van Dyke housing projects in New York City. Each were in the same geographical area, had the same socio-economic background (single mothers, African American’s, on welfare etc.) and the same density per acre. The only differences between the projects was building size (Brownsville was a series of low rise apartment blocks while Van Dyke was a series of high rise apartment blocks) and the crime rate between the two housing projects (Brownsville had a much lower crime rate than Van Dyke). Newman argues that Brownsville has a much lower crime rate because
 Brownsville’s lower height gave an opportunity for casual surveillance
 The semi-public area in front of Brownsville gave a sense of territory
 Tenants knew their neighbours and identify and stop strangers from entering their building
 Brownsville entrances served only 9 to 13 families while Van Dyke’s entrances served 112 to 136 families. (BBC, 1978)
Building on Oscar and Jacobs work was Dr. C. Ray Jeffery whom coined the term Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) in his book of the same name in 1971. His work expanded upon the assumption that the proper design and effective use of the built environment can lead to a reduction in the fear of crime and the incidence of crime, and to an improvement in the quality of life. (Crowe, 2000, 4) This has led to a more practical approach by including lighting, surveillance, access control, landscaping and territorial reinforcement. (Crowe, 2000; Colquhoun, 2004; CMHC, 1995; Ekblom, 1995; Lab, 2004; Wekerle and Whitzman, 1995)
In recent years CPTED has increasingly begun to embrace the social aspects of sustainable development. “Second generation CPTED” as it is known views the design of the built environment as only the first step to creating a healthy, sustainable communities. What really counts is creating a sense of community through a holistic approach to physical, social and economic development. (Colquhoun, 2004, 62) Key points of this new CPTED are
 Size of the district, density and differentiation of dwellings – human scale development
 Urban meeting places
 Youth clubs
 Residents’ participation
 Residents’ responsibility
 Small systems for survival (as opposed to large economies of scale and tertiary academic institutions (Cleveland and Saville, 2000; Colquhoun, 2004)
Due to the nature of this class, the first generation of CPTED will be the main focus of the paper rather than the socially oriented second generation CPTED.
Components
CPTED is does not reduce crime or improve perceptions of an area by one technique alone. In order to perform properly it must encompass a wide variety of components that together can alter the environment and in turn, change the perceptions and actions of humans.
Lighting
Exterior lighting is one of the most widely used techniques in CPTED techniques because “after dark, fears of personal violence and risks are heightened for both men and women. (Wekerle and Whitzman, 1995, 28) Additionally, there is a natural fear and avoidance of darkened areas because we simply do not know what awaits us in the darkened area.
CPTED proponents state that this fear is not unwarranted as “badly designed and poorly lit areas offer opportunities for crime to occur and give the message that an area is uncared for.” (Wekerle and Whitzman,1995, 28) Increasing the brightness of lighting is said to decrease crime by enhancing the ability of identify and apprehend criminals, increased outdoor activity that in turn creates more surveillance, increase community pride and sense of ownership in an a locale. (Schneider and Pearcey, 1996; Colquhoun, 2004; Crowe, 2000; Lab, 2004; Wekerle and Whitzman, 1995)
A key problem in current lighting practices is the fact that most lighting is made for travel by car and not for pedestrian uses. Since lights are perched high above the sidewalk and are centered on the road this often does not allow potential victims to see their surroundings or potential offenders. This in turn can cause less people to use the area, reduce surveillance and give offenders a greater ability to commit a crime and not be apprehended or identified. There is also a problem with the consistency of lighting.
Many public transit users report the temporary blinding effect of passing by a floor-lit bus shelter onto an under-lit street. Alleys, inset doorways, and other potential hiding spots adjacent to well-traveled routes sometimes have no lighting at all. (Wekerle and Whitzman., 1995)
When designing for effective lighting the following criteria should be used:
 If the place is intended to be used at night, can you identify a face 15 meters/yards away?
 Are pedestrian pathways, laneways, access routes in outdoor public spaces lit to the minimum standard of four foot-candles?
 Is lighting consistent, i.e., with few or no areas of shadow or glare, in order to reduce contrast between shadows and illuminated areas?
 Does street lighting shine on pedestrian pathways and possible entrapment spaces rather than on the road?
 Are inset doorways, alcoves, and above- or below-grade entrances lit?
 Does lighting take into account vegetation, including mature trees, and other potential blocks?
 Are light fixtures secure from tampering or vandalism (Schneider and Pearcey, 1996, 20; Wekerle and Whitzman, 1995, 30)
Target Hardening
One of the most basic CPTED concepts is target hardening, “the effort of making houses, buildings and other crime targets more difficult to physically penetrate and thus prevent victimization entirely or at least reduce the amount of loss that occurs.” (Schneider and Pearcey, 1996, 16) The goal of target hardening is to discourage criminals from entering buildings by showing that entry will either take a great deal of effort (thus making decreasing the value of the payoff) and increasing the chance of being apprehended (as picking a lock takes considerably longer than kicking a door in).
Some of the strategies used for target hardening include dead bolt locks on doors, alarm systems, removing access points such as a window cill, installing lighting in vulnerable access points and property identification (Schneider and Pearcey, 1996; Lab, 2004) However target hardening is not without its problems, particularly its human element. The principal problem associated with target hardening hardware is their lack of use (such as forgetting to lock a door, or turn on an alarm) which renders these security devices of little value. (Schneider and Pearcey, 1996, 17)
Territoriality/Defensible Space
At the core of the CPTED model is Territoriality “the capacity of the physical environment to create for each individual perceived zones of spatial influence that result in a proprietary interest and felt responsibility.” (Gardiner, 1987, 14) According to CPTED theory, there are three types of users that need to be described in order for territoriality to work.
Normal users are those who have a legitimate reason to be in a certain space.
Abnormal users are person’s who do not have a legitimate reason to be in a place and whom normal users do not want in that space. Observers are those persons who have to be in that space to support the human function. (Crowe, 2000; Newman, 1972)
When territoriality has been instilled into the normal users of, for example, an apartment block they will readily intervene in criminal or troubling activities and prevent an abnormal user from entry into the building. Thus, “The Defensible Space theory is premised on the belief that private areas are less susceptible to crime than semi-private, semi-public and public areas which are the most susceptible.” (Schneider and Pearcey, 1996, 12)
According to Oscar Newman the creation of defensible space deters crime by:
1) The capacity of the physical environment to create perceived zones of territorial influences;
2) The capacity of physical design to provide surveillance opportunities for residents
3) The capacity of physical design to influence the perception of a project’s uniqueness, isolation and stigma and;
4) The influence of geographical juxtaposition with ‘safe zones’ on the security of adjacent areas, referring to the general quality of a housing complex’s location, including environmental and socio-economic characteristics (Newman, 1972, 50)
These four aspects are achieved by three inter-connected design principles. The first is to Provide a clear definition of controlled space (Schneider and Pearcey, 1996, 12). This first step is the most basic as it provides identification and personalization of space. Being able to identify and personalize a space tends to make normal users more likely to have a strong attachment to that space. In turn, normal users will be more likely to ward off abnormal users and thus reduce problems and or crime. Controlled space also defines ownership and is a powerful environmental cue that affects behaviour of offenders. (Crowe, 2000, 115) The reasoning behind this assumption is that abnormal users will avoid targeting or entering the controlled space because there is a greater chance of apprehension and confrontation as residents are on the lookout for them.
It is interesting to note that a number of scholars in this field have related building size to personalization of space. “The belief is that larger the multi-dwelling building the less frequently residents will use the space adjacent to their dwellings. The result is less control over that space by residents.” (Schneider and Pearcey, 1996, 13) In Newman and Franck’s 1980 study Factors Influencing Crime and Instability in Urban Housing Developments, study of major housing projects in the United States found that fear of crime and levels of crime decreased in smaller buildings. The reasoning was that large number of residents combined with the gigantic size of the building isolated people and made them feel lost in the space of the building.
Some ways to bring create and define controlled space are
 Private spaces on residential lots should look different from public streets
 Visual buffers in the form of private yards or patios should be built between public pathways, courtyard of streets and the private area of dwelling interior
 Real or symbolic barriers should be erected to discourage strangers from entering residents’ territory, fences, shrubbery or signs can be used as definitions of borders
 Subdividing housing complexes into small enclaves, recognizable and identifiable by the residents
 Open space should belong indisputably to a particular group of dwellings
 Limit the number of apartments per floor in multiple family dwelling units
 Limit the number of multiple-family housing units to between four and eight for a single access (Schneider and Pearcey, 1996, 12-13)
The second design principle to make territoriality and defensible space are clearly marked transitional zones. By marking out where public territory ends and where private territory begins “this helps to communicate to the resident, neighbor and potential criminals that ‘out of bounds’ areas begins before they reach an entrance or apartment door.” (Geason and Wilson, 1989, 16) By clearly defining this boundary, normal users can challenge abnormal users earlier and with greater success than if the boundary were located at the doorway. Some ways of achieving this are to
 Increasing lighting at the entrance or just prior to it
 A hierarchy of lighting intensities and different types of lighting should accompany sequential
 Change in the level of walkways
 Changing floor colouring (Schneider and Pearcey, 1996, 14)
The third and final design principle to produce territoriality and defensible space is Design space to maximize (the perception of) natural surveillance. One of the underlying principles of defensible space is that design should generate opportunities for people to see and be seen continuously. (Schneider and Pearcey, 1996, 14) According to Gardiner (1978, 15) natural surveillance is the capacity of physical design to provide surveillance opportunities for residents. By knowing that the area is watched residents feel less prone to criminal acts as these “eyes on the ground” to watch and deter criminals from entering their private space. Criminals in turn will more or less avoid this area due to the fact that their identification and capture are much greater. Encouraging natural surveillance can be accomplished through
 locating windows and entries to maximize natural surveillance
 ensuring each dwelling entry is visible from as many other dwellings as possible
 relocating gathering areas to locations with natural surveillance and access control
 locate windows so that casual surveillance of entries, open parking lots, open spaces, children’s playgrounds and footpaths are possible from frequently used rooms (Schneider and Pearcey, 1996, 15)
Real Surveillance
Surveillance also operates outside of the territorial/defensible space confines. In making this delineation, it can be said that surveillance operates in two ways; the psychological (facilitating the feelings of territoriality) and the real (the ability of residents and bystanders to actually spot offenders). (Schneider and Pearcey, 1996, 15) In addition to deterring criminals’ real surveillance it helps normal users feel safer as they feel that someone is “keeping an eye on them.” (Wekerle and Whitzman, 1995, 40) With more people on the street, there is an increased chance that criminals will bypass this spot, a greater chance of people thwarting a criminal act and a greater chance of identifying and capturing a criminal. (Colquhoun, 2004; Crowe, 2000; Lab, 2004; Schneider and Pearcey, 1996; Wekerle and Whitzman, 1995) This technique of populating the streets with normal users harkens back to Jacobs notion of “eyes on the street.”
Real surveillance can be accomplished through two different methods; passive or natural and active or mechanical/organized. Passive or natural surveillance uses the public and businesses to conduct surveillance and ensure that civility is kept in place. Examples of passive surveillance include orientating buildings so that their windows face the street, doors facing the street, street vendors such as hotdog stands and increasing outdoor activity and pedestrian traffic. (Jacobs, 1961; Lab, 2004, 38) Mechanical or mechanical/organized surveillance involves using formal or technology to watch the public. Examples of this kind of surveillance are Closed Circuit Television (CCTV), increased police presence and security patrols.
Landscaping
Landscaping is an integral part of the urban landscape. Without it the city would seem to be an inhospitable and depressing place to be. It also plays an important in CPTED due to the concealment opportunities many types of plants provide. (CMHC, 1996, 20; Colquhoun, 2004, 176-178) In addition to being used for aesthetic purposes, planting can be used to prevent access into private and semi-private areas, climbing plants can be used to cover walls subject to graffiti and thorny plants can keep people away from vulnerable and private areas. (Colquhoun, 2004, 177) Some general recommendations for landscaping principles are:
 plant growth rates should be assessed prior to landscaping
 plants should be regularly maintained and trimmed
 shrubs should be set back from the edges of paths
 shrubs should be kept away from doors and windows
 landscaping should be vandal proof
 formal hedge heights should be specified the lower the better (Schneider and Pearcey, 1996, 20)
Does CPTED Really Work?
Many of the concepts concerning the behaviour of humans are only theories and because of this, many of them are subject to intense scrutiny. CPTED is no different, for all of its proponents there are an equal amount of critics. One of the main criticisms has been a lack of empirical evidence supporting the assumption that CPTED actually decreases the amount of crime. To attempt to see how criminals behave under CPTED a local urban explorer whom goes by the name of Curious George was interviewed. (Urban exploration is the hobby of exploring the forbidden places in an urban area such as abandoned buildings, steam tunnels, drains and mechanical rooms etc.)
Lighting
Although lighting is a crucial portion of CPTED techniques there has been a lack of studies on the effect improved lighting has on decreasing crime and the fear of crime. There is some research available on the topic of lighting and its effects but the results of these studies are inconsistent results.
Various early studies in the United States reported no impact and even increased crime after lighting changes….in an early review of 15 relighting projects, Tien et al. (1977) reported a great deal of inconsistency in the results. Seven projects reported decreases in at least some categories of crime, three showed increased crime levels and seven found no changes in crime attributable to street lighting. (Lab, 2004, 41)
In addition, when the city of Coeur d’Alene, Idaho could no longer afford to light a section of the downtown commercial district, there was actually a decrease in the crime rate over the previous year. (Premo and Scates, 1982)
To make matters even more difficult, recent studies have shown that there truly is a positive impact of lighting, particularly by Painter and Farrington’s 1997 report in Dudley, England. Using victimization survey data, the authors report a 41 percent reduction in crime incidents in the experimental areas and only a 15 percent reduction in crime in the control area. (Lab, 2004, 41) Curious George (the urban explorer whom was interviewed) claims that lighting does have an impact in some cases. In one instance for example, he stated that access into the building could not be attained as there was a light over his entry point (which required the removal of a wooden board).
Despite the fact that there is no discernable outcome from lighting there has been one clear benefit, a reduction in fear of crime where lighting has been increased. In the Coeur d’Alene, Idaho study found that citizens felt much more comfortable in the lighted area compared to the unlit area. Various studies by Atkins et al. (1991) and Painter and Farrington (1997, 1999b) reveal that women and elderly respondents who recognize changes in lighting worry less about crime and feel safer. (Lab, 2004, 42)
Real Surveillance
The advantages of having “Eyes on the Street” may not be an advantage according numerous empirical studies. Numerous studies have suggested that increases in public activity are counterbalanced by a lessened sense of responsibility and a diminished ability to judge what is suspicious behaviour. (Schneider and Pearcey, 1996, 33) Some critics have even pointed out that more people leads to crowding, greater incivility and increased possibility for certain types of crime (i.e. pick pocketing). (Maxfield, 1987) A study in 1997 found that typical hotspots of crime were on street corners with two or three attached buildings and with mixed uses. (Taylor, 1997, 13)
In addition, there is have been a number of studies indicating that the public often does not notice crimes being committed (e.g. shoplifting, pick pocketing) the public may misperceive signals (e.g. the struggles of a murder victim were thought to be a lovers’ quarrel), or the public may not wish to become involved out of personal fear or the unwillingness to be caught in the long legal-bureaucratic proceedings. (Schneider and Kitchen, 2002, 94) Curious George can recount numerous times when he has scaled buildings in front of major thoroughfares without being accosted by anyone. In particular, he recalls a mission when he dressed up as a construction worker and began to pop manholes in the middle of the day on a portion of Main Street that was under construction without being questioned once. He also claims that one person remarked to him that “It must suck working on a Sunday.” It is obvious then that even with lots of people on the street, if a criminal is determined and skilled s/he can accomplish their goals.
There are also a number of drawbacks to using mechanical surveillance devices such as CCTV. The first is the high capital cost of installing and maintaining such a system. As structural add-ons (device, cabling and connection), they may be more expensive than designing surveillance features into construction. (Schneider and Kitchen, 2002, 95-96) Another problem arises with response time and the effectiveness of the CCTV operators to respond to situations. In most cases in urban contexts, helpers are too distant or the criminal event is too rapid for effective intervention. (Schneider and Kitchen, 2002, 96) Nevertheless, there have been many studies in the United Kingdom (Welsh and Warrington, 2002; Brown, 1995; Ditton and Short, 1999) that support CCTV as an active agent of crime deterrence for some types of crimes. (i.e. those that are not fueled by drugs)
Crime Displacement
One of the most persistent problems with the theory of CPTED has been that of crime displacement; “the possibility that offenders, blocked in their first choice of target, will not always give up but may try different methods of attack, seek similar targets at other times and places, or change to another type of target altogether.” (Ekblom, 1995, 123; Colquhoun, 2004; Schneider and Kitchen, 2002; Lab, 2004) Essentially, displacement suggests that place-based crime prevention is a zero-sum game. (Schneider and Kitchen, 2002, 113)
Recent studies have shown evidence in displacement in areas where CPTED techniques have been implemented. In an analysis of CCTV in town centers, Brown (1995) indicates that both robbery and personal theft are displaced to other areas. (Lab, 2004, 101) Similar results were found in studies by Ekblom et al., 1996a, Tilley, 1993 and Bowers and Johnson, 2003. It was also found that in two areas where street lighting was improved, there was a corresponding increase in daylight crime rates within the same areas (Lab, 2004, 102)
There are studies however that paint a completely different picture. Ditton and Short (1999), examining the impact of CCTV in two Scottish cities, report no evidence of displacement to areas immediately adjacent to the experimental areas. (Lab, 2002, 101) Studies by Barr and Pease (1990), Hesseling (1994), Clarke (1997) and Hill and Pease (2001) all report that there was no crime displaced to surrounding areas. Some scholars have even gone on to say that “displacement is not always the serious issue people imagined it to be.” (Colquhoun, 2004, 6) One of the most influential agents against this idea is Professor Rene B.P. Hesseling. In his 1994 paper he categorically proved that displacement was serious by examining 55 published articles on crime prevention methods that specifically looked at crime displacement. Of the 55 studies, 22 of these found no displacement, six found some beneficial measures in surrounding areas while 33 found some limited form of displacement. (Colquhoun, 2002, 6)
Territoriality/Defensible Space
In light of Newman and other academics work concerning territoriality and defensible space, critics have stated that there has been far too much importance placed on this single issue. Critics often point out that CPTED is often viewed as a “silver bullet” that is able to solve many different crimes across many different social and geographical spectrums. (Taylor, 2002, 417) Hillier (1973) and Reppetto (1974) argue instead that race and socio-economic characteristics of a community are much more important to both crime and feelings of territoriality/social cohesion than the manner in which the environment is designed. (Schneider and Pearcey, 1996, 35) The age demographics of residents also plays a key role in determining crime rates. A report in 1978 on 285 housing blocks in London revealed that vandalism was higher where there was a higher density of children than those without a high density of children or no children at all. (Schneider and Pearcey, 1996) Even buildings that reflected Newman’s idea’s about proper building design had high crime. In Merry’s Urban Affairs Quarterly journal article (1981) a four-story building was studied that had many of Newman’s factors for defensible space. Yet Merry found that this building had one of the highest per capita robbery and assault rates for city housing project. This finding was explained by the fact that more there was an intense ethnic diversity that helped create and fuel a neighbourhood of strangers. Merry made a critical distinction between space that is defensible and space that is actually defended…..physical design may establish the preconditions for citizens to exercise social control (defensible space) but it cannot guarantee such behaviours (defended space). (Schneider and Pearcey, 1996, 36)
Empirical Studies
One of the greatest challenges in proving that CPTED actually reduces crime is the empirical studies used to study whether or not a CPTED program has worked. In many cases there are severe flaws in how researchers collect and compare collected data. Much of the research on environmental design is based on cross-sectional data and therefore is only weak evidence that redesigning the built environment will produce changes in crime, fear of crime and community cohesion. (Rosenbaum, 1988, 368-370) Additionally, many have stated that “for those applied projects that registered positive results in the short term, there is little reason to believe that these results have been maintained in the medium or long term (Schneider and Pearcey, 1996, 36)
Another problem lies in socio-economic factors which often times complicate and muddy the casual link between environmental design and crime rates. This particularly becomes difficult when socio-economic variables that are traditionally associated with high rates of crime make it difficult to isolate individual effects of physical and spatial design on the incidence of crime. (Schneider and Pearcey, 1996, 36; Bynum and Perri, 1984, 185) In short, the validity and credibility of CPTED techniques have been undermined simply because its findings (whether they be positive or negative) have far too many intervening variables that cannot be controlled. (Schneider and Pearcey, 1996, 37; Linden, 1990, 57)
Conclusion
After examining the components of CPTED and the positive and negative reactions to such components the question must be asked, where CPTED can be applied and can it even be applied. The first point that should be addressed is that CPTED should be applied to part of a wider and more comprehensive crime prevention program. CPTED works by changing the built environment, what it does not change are the social conditions that can potentially breed crime.
If solutions are to be found, it is necessary to first understand the basic environmental organization of neighbourhoods and the complex series of causes and effects that allow the occurrence of opportunity crimes. To respond to these complex problems requires a range of reinforcing solutions, both physical and social….over dependence on any one tool, whether law enforcement, social or physical will not only fail but will ultimately diminish the effectiveness of the tool being used. (Gardiner, 1982, 44-45)
Secondly, it appears that CPTED works more efficiently and successfully in socially stable and cohesive environments. In order for CPTED to work, the residents/users of an area must be able to work with one another in order “…to create a strong sense of responsibility for and control over the local environment by residents.” (Atlas, 1991) Generally, sense of community is higher in neighbourhoods that are middle or higher income that typically have more long-term, home owning and homogenous social characteristics. (Schneider and Pearcey, 1996, 37)
The silver bullet that was supposed to solve and decrease crime has been far from perfect at doing so. Criminals have been able to bypass many of the techniques and in many cases crime has shifted to other areas or different times. For all of its shortcomings, CPTED still plays an important part in any large crime prevention strategy. The benefits of implementing CPTED are not only reductions in crime but also an improved quality of life for its surrounding citizens by improving the aesthetics of the urban landscape and a dramatic reduction in the fear of crime.
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Parteimitglied
Location: Manitoba, Canada
| | Re: Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design
<Reply # 1 on 11/25/2005 12:47 AM >
| | | | Nice paper, is this your work?
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